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On 3 April 2010, the Obama administration an-nounced that it would delay publication of the semi-annual exchange rate report to Congress (due on
15 April) containing the international economic and ex-
change rate policies of America’s major trading partners. The
report was eagerly awaited because it would officially state
the Obama administration’s position on China’s exchange
rate policy, in particular whether Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner would declare China a “currency manipulator.” In-
stead, striking a measured tone, Geithner tactfully noted,
“China’s inflexible exchange rate has made it difficult for
other emerging market economies to let their currencies ap-
preciate. A move by China to a more market-oriented ex-
change rate will make an essential contribution to global re-
balancing.” Geithner noted that “the best avenue for advanc-
ing U.S. interests at this time” is via discussions in multilat-
eral and bilateral forums, including that of the G-20 finance
ministers and central bank governors in late April; the semi-
annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the
United States and China in May; and during the meeting of
G-20 leaders and finance ministers in June. (1) To further as-
suage Beijing, Geithner 7 April made an impromptu 75-
minute stopover at the VIP terminal of Beijing airport (on his
way to India) to meet with Vice Premier Wang Qishan
(China’s leading finance official) to “exchange views on
U.S.-China economic relations and the global economy.” (2)
The Treasury’s conciliatory message was no doubt intended
to deescalate tensions that had been brewing for months be-
tween Beijing and Washington. In fact, the latest round of
the war of words began during Geithner’s confirmation hear-
ing (in January 2009) for Treasury Secretary when he
bluntly stated that both he and “President Obama – backed
by the conclusions of a broad range of economists – believe
that China is manipulating its currency.” (3) Geithner’s tough
rhetoric brought nods of approval from the members of the
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1. “Statement of Treasury Secretary Geithner on the Report to Congress on International
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” 3 April 2010, United States Department of the
Treasury, no. TG-627, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg627.htm.
2. Bill Powell, “Why Geithner Made A Surprise Stop in Beijing,” Time, 8 April 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978666,00.html?xid=rss-fullworld-
yahoo; and Keith Bradsher, “China Seems Set to Loosen Hold on Its Currency,” 8 April
2010, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/business/global/
09yuan. html?ref=business&src=me&pagewanted=print.
3. In his written statement to the Senate panel, Geithner noted then senator Obama’s sup-
port for “tough legislation to overhaul the US process for determining currency manip-
ulation and authorizing new enforcement measures so countries like China cannot con-
tinue to get a free pass for undermining fair trade principles.” However, the Obama
administration quickly backtracked from Geithner’s statement and declined to label
China a “currency manipulator.” Rather, the administration noted that while it still
believes that the yuan is undervalued, it also recognises that China has taken steps to
rebalance its economy and enhance exchange-rate flexibility. See Lori Montgomery and
Anthony Faiola, “Geithner Says China Manipulates Its Currency,” The Washington Post,
23 January 2009, p. A08, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/arti-
cle/2009/01/22/ AR2009012203796.html; and also, “Statement by Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner on Release of Semi-Annual Report to U.S. Congress on International
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” 15 April 2009, http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases.tg90.htm.
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ABSTRACT: China is now the world’s leading creditor nation, while the United States is the world’s largest debtor.
Beijing is the largest foreign holder of US government debt – passing Japan in 2008 to become, in effect, the US
government’s largest foreign creditor. While some claim this gives Beijing unprecedented power over the United
States, others claim that China’s power is in fact greatly circumscribed. This paper shows that although current
patterns of economic interdependence between the two economies invariably pushes each towards cooperation, China
is deeply concerned about the future trajectory of the US economy and is already engaged in loosening the bonds of
interdependence. This has profound implications for Sino-US relations and the global economy. 
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Senate Finance Committee – many of whom have long ral-
lied against Beijing’s alleged malpractice and were now
hoping for a firm stance against China from the new
Obama administration. However, to the markets, Geith-
ner’s clumsy and accusatory tone signalled a potential con-
frontation between the world’s largest and third largest
economies. The already jittery markets responded almost
immediately as investors became concerned that China
might scale back its purchase of US debt if the new admin-
istration pushed Beijing to further revalue its currency: the
dollar promptly fell, the price of gold jumped by $40, and
the price of Treasury debt was driven lower. (4) Although
Geithner tried to gloss over his remarks by stating that
what he actually meant was for China to adopt “market ex-
change rates,” it brought only short respite to this sensitive
subject. 
Clearly slighted, the usually unflappable Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao fired back by blaming the US-led financial sys-
tem for the world’s economic crisis. Wen, the first Chinese
premier to visit the annual global meeting of the world’s
powerful in Davos (Switzerland), delivered an uncharacter-
istically stinging indictment against the West, in particular,
the United States; although he did not directly name the
United States, the target of his remarks was unmistakable.
Wen blamed an “excessive expansion of financial institu-
tions in blind pursuit of profit,” a failure of government su-
pervision of the financial sector, and an “unsustainable
model of development, characterized by prolonged low sav-
ings and high consumption” for the global financial crisis. (5)
Again, on 14 March 2009, speaking at a news conference
at the end of the Chinese parliament’s annual session,
Wen said he was “worried” about the safety of China’s
over $1 trillion investments in American government debt
and that Beijing was watching economic developments in
the United States closely. Wen expressed concern that the
massive stimulus expenditures in the US could lead to soar-
ing deficits – which in turn could sink the dollar’s value and
thereby China’s massive investments. With so much at
stake, Wen broke with protocol by lecturing Washington on
financial management – urging the Obama administration
to focus on important matters such as providing guarantees
that China’s investment in the United States would keep its
value. Wen bluntly noted: “We have lent a huge amount of
money to the USA. Of course we are concerned about the
safety of our assets. To be honest, I am definitely a little
worried… the United States must maintain its good credit,
honor its promises and guarantee the safety of China’s as-
sets.” (6) In order to reassure Beijing, President Obama (the
leader of the world’s largest debtor nation), promptly
replied, stating, “Not just the Chinese Government, but
every investor can have absolute confidence in the sound-
ness of investments in the U.S.” In addition, Obama also
pledged to support China’s long-standing demand for
greater voting power within the IMF (International Mone-
tary Fund). (7)
Yet, despite these assurances China remained concerned.
On 24 March 2009, unambiguously underscoring Beijing’s
fear that the rapidly growing US budget deficits could drive
down the dollar and with it the value of China’s investments
(especially in US Treasuries), Zhou Xiaochuan, the inde-
fatigable Governor of the People’s Bank of China, called for
the creation of a new international reserve currency (which
he termed a “super-sovereign reserve currency”) to replace
the dollar because “an international reserve currency that is
disconnected from individual nations is able to remain stable
in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies
caused by using credit-based national currencies.” (8) On 26
June 2009, the People’s Bank again renewed its call for a
new global currency, noting that the IMF should manage
more of members’ foreign-exchange reserves. Since coun-
tries acquire portfolios of foreign exchange when they limit
the appreciation of the currencies in the face of balance-of-
payment surpluses, China, which holds a massive portfolio
of foreign exchange (mostly in dollar-denominated assets),
now claimed that the credit-based national reserve curren-
cies (like the dollar) contributed not only to global imbal-
ances, but also to financial crises. To Zhou, a new currency
reserve system controlled by the IMF would be more stable
and more economically viable because it would be used for
international trade, financial transactions, and commodity
pricing. In essence, Zhou’s proposal suggested a “gradual”
replacement of the dollar with Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs) – which was introduced by the IMF in 1969 as an
international reserve to support the Bretton Woods fixed ex-
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4. Treasury securities are the debt financing instruments of the US Federal government.
They are often referred to as Treasuries. There are four types of marketable treasury
securities: Treasury bills, Treasury notes, Treasury bonds, and Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPS).
5. Julian Glover, “Wen the Premier speaks,” The Guardian, Wednesday, 28 January 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/28/wen-jiabao-china-davos/print.
6. Michael Wines, “China’s Leader Says He Is ‘Worried’ Over U.S. Treasuries,” The New York
Times, 14 March 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/business/ worldbusi-
ness/14china.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.
7. Chinese President Hu Jintao has long called for expanding China’s voting rights at the
IMF. Currently the members of the European Union have a combined 32 percent of vot-
ing rights, the US has 17 percent, while China has 3.7 percent and India 1.9 percent. 
8. Zhou’s statement is published in English and Chinese on the central bank’s (People’s
Bank of China) website : “Reform the International Monetary System,” 23 March 2009,
http:// www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=178.
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change rate regime. (9) Zhou’s proposal would expand the
basket of currencies that currently constitutes the basis of
SDR valuation to all large economies (such as Russia) and
set up a settlement system between SDRs and other curren-
cies so they could be used in international trade and finan-
cial transactions. This would mean, first, that countries
would entrust a portion of their SDR reserves to the IMF to
manage collectively on their behalf, and second, that SDRs
would gradually replace existing reserve currencies.
If China’s fixation on the safety of its huge dollar reserves
was meant to obfuscate its currency conundrum, it clearly
did not work. The ubiquitous issue of China’s allegedly arti-
ficially undervalued currency (the renminbi, also called the
yuan) would not go away. (10) By allowing the renminbi to
modestly appreciate from 2005 to 2008, China had man-
aged to placate its critics. (11) However, under intense pres-
sure during the subprime-induced global financial crisis, Bei-
jing was forced to resume its earlier practice of pegging the
renminbi to a nearly fixed rate to revive its faltering export-
dependent economy. Since the People’s Bank of China (the
country’s central bank) tightly controls the renminbi’s move-
ments through its interventions in the market, Beijing has
kept its currency pegged at near 6.83 yuan per US dollar
since mid-2008 to help its companies compete amid weak
global demand. (12) To critics, this was just the latest of Bei-
jing’s blatant acts. By deliberately keeping the yuan under-
valued, Beijing gains unfair advantages for its exporters; a
free-floating yuan would erode China’s advantage, and with
it much of the global “imbalance” in world trade. 
Predictably, Beijing’s decision only galvanised the critics and
triggered a torrent of sharp condemnations. In March 2010,
some 130 House members (both Democrats and Republi-
cans) sent a strongly-worded letter to Geithner demanding
that he takes immediate action, including declaring China a
“currency manipulator” and imposing tariffs and other puni-
tive measures to force Beijing to stop manipulating the value
of its currency to gain an unfair trade advantage. A number
of influential lawmakers, including the overzealous but influ-
ential senators Charles Schumer (Democrat) and Charles
Grassley (the top Republican on the Senate Finance Com-
mittee), even proposed legislation to effectively threaten
China with trade sanctions for deliberately undermining
global trade through its undervalued currency – as the yuan
undervalued by some 40 percent gives Chinese exporters an
unfair price advantage. (13)
Beijing’s response has been equally swift and uncharacteris-
tically terse – adding fuel to an already explosive subject.
Commerce Minister Chen Deming accused the United
States of politicising and exaggerating the issue, and in a
blistering public statement made clear that China would not
take kindly to such actions stating, “If [the Treasury Depart-
ment’s] reply is accompanied by trade sanctions and trade
measures, we will not ignore it.” Chen warned, “If some con-
gressmen insist on labeling China as a currency manipulator
and slap punitive tariffs on Chinese products, then the [Chi-
nese] government will find it impossible not to react… If the
United States uses the exchange rate to start a new trade
war, China will be hurt. But the American people and US
companies will be hurt even more.” Chen also indignantly
dismissed US criticisms, (14) reiterating Premier Wen Jiabao’s
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9. However, in the late 1960s, when the US dollar liabilities to foreign nations exceeded the US
gold stock, it brought into question the core commitment of the Bretton Woods system –
the US promise to convert all dollars held abroad into gold at a fixed price ($35 per ounce
of gold). Although, the Bretton Woods regime collapsed in 1973, the value of SDRs is still
based on a basket of four currencies – the US dollar, yen, euro, and pound sterling. The IMF
initially defined the SDR in terms of a fixed amount of gold and allocated 9.3 billion SDRs
between 1970 and 1972 to member countries in proportion to their quotas. Following the
adoption of floating exchange rates in the mid-1970s, the IMF redefined the SDR as a
weighted average of the US dollar, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the currencies
that eventually comprised the euro. However, the SDR never supplanted the dollar as a
reserve currency unit. Rather, it devolved into a unit of account, and despite frustration
about the dollar’s role as a reserve currency (especially during times when the dollar depre-
ciated on a broad basis) the US dollar remains the world’s key international currency.
10. The renminbi is the name of the Chinese currency, while the yuan is one unit of the cur-
rency. 
11. Between July 2005 and 2008, a managed currency float saw the yuan gradually gain
21 percent against the dollar.
12. According to the Bank for International Settlements, from July 2005 to February 2009,
the yuan rose by 28 percent in real trade-weighted terms. However, the sharp export
contraction forced Beijing to repeg the yuan to the dollar. Since February 2009, the
yuan’s real trade-weighted value has lost about 8 percent. Of course, disagreement per-
sists regarding the extent to which the yuan is undervalued – with claims ranging from
10 percent to 30 percent. For a recent view, see Arvind Subramanian, “New PPP-Based
Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy Implications,” Policy Brief, no. PB10-
8, April 2010, Washington, DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
13. Schumer made clear that he would push a bill to impose anti-dumping duties on some
Chinese goods and countervailing tariffs on all of them if Beijing did not allow its cur-
rency to strengthen. 
14. John Pomfret, “China’s Commerce Minister: U.S. has the most to lose in a trade war,”
Washington Post, Monday, 22 March 2010, A06; and Gillian Wong, “China warns US
against sanctions over currency,” Associated Press, 21 March 2010, http://news.yahoo.
com/s/ap/20100321/ap_on_bi_ge/as_china_trade/print. Striking a more conciliatory
tone, Zhong Shan, Chinese vice-minister of commerce, in an op-ed in The Wall Street
Journal argued that “there is little connection between the trade balance and the value
of the renminbi.” On the contrary, “China-U.S. trade and economic cooperation has gen-
erated huge and real benefits for the United States… Since the outbreak of the interna-
tional financial crisis, China has been supporting the efforts of the American people to
tackle the crisis. On the one hand, China has increased imports from the U.S. While over-
all U.S. exports dropped 17.9 percent in 2009, exports to China hardly decreased. Many
U.S. manufacturing firms have found comfort in the Chinese market as a shelter against
the global financial storm. On the other hand, good value-for-money, labor-intensive
goods imported from China have helped keep the cost of living down for Americans even
when they become increasingly cash-strapped. Without consumer goods from China,
the U.S. price index would go up an extra two percentage points every year.… As Wen
Jiabao, the Chinese premier, recently reiterated, it is always better to have a dialogue
than a confrontation, cooperation than containment, and a partnership than a rivalry. As
long as we approach the China-U.S. commercial relationship in a responsible manner
we will definitely be able to make it more stable and sound.” See Zhong Shan, “U.S.-
China Trade Is Win-Win Game,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 March 2010. 
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earlier statement denying that the yuan was undervalued or
that China’s exchange-rate policies were behind American
deficits and the trade imbalance. Rather, Chen blamed re-
strictive US export policies, especially on high-tech dual-use
goods such as supercomputers and satellites, for the US
trade deficit problem. In similar vein, Vice Premier Wang
Qishan has repeatedly stated that the United States trade
deficit reflects a low US savings rate and profligate spending
– a problem that even a moderate rise in the yuan’s ex-
change rate will not resolve. He urged the Obama adminis-
tration to “take all necessary measures to stabilize its econ-
omy and financial markets to ensure the security of China’s
assets and investments in the US.” Most notably, Wang pub-
licly lectured Geithner and other senior U.S. officials to take
“credible steps” to protect the value of the dollar and that
“high attention should be given to fiscal deficits.” (15) China,
the biggest creditor nation to the United States, has every
reason to be concerned about the potential inflationary im-
pact of Washington’s monetary and fiscal policies.
What to make of this heated tit-for-tat? Is it just rhetorical
bluster or does it presage a widening of the fault-lines in
Sino-US relations? If the latter is the case, what are the po-
tential implications for Sino-US relations? A number of
plausible and not-so plausible explanations have been ad-
vanced. For example, historian Niall Ferguson has unam-
biguously argued that Sino-US relations are poised to be-
come increasingly confrontational and conflict-ridden – in-
deed, very much like the British-German geopolitical rivalry
that led to the First World War. (16) In a similar vein, Nobel
laureate Paul Krugman has argued that “China has become
a major financial and trade power. But it doesn’t act like
other big economies. Instead, it follows a ‘mercantilist pol-
icy,’ keeping its trade surplus artificially high. And in today’s
depressed world, that policy is, to put it bluntly, preda-
tory.” (17) Krugman proposes a rather provocative strategy ar-
guing that “It’s time to take a stand” and play “hardball”
with China. (18) Similarly, Morici concludes that “diplomacy
has failed, and President Obama should impose a tax on
dollar yuan conversions in an amount equal to the amount of
China currency market intervention divided by its exports –
currently that would be about 28 percent. For imports, at
least, that would offset Chinese subsidies that harm U.S.
businesses and workers. Ultimately, the amount of the tax
would be in China’s hands. If Beijing reduced currency mar-
ket intervention and let the yuan appreciate, the tax rate
would fall. If Beijing stopped intervening, the tax would go
to zero…. American failure to act would amount to no more
than appeasement, and wholesale neglect of President
Obama’s obligations to ensure U.S. economic security and
sovereignty.” (19)
Yet, others warn that if the Obama administration adopts an
uncompromisingly belligerent policy towards Beijing, it will
incur painful economic costs. This is because the global eco-
nomic landscape has fundamentally changed and the United
States is no longer in a position to unilaterally call the shots.
The new reality is that China is now officially the US gov-
ernment’s largest foreign creditor, while America holds the
distinction of being the world’s largest debtor. (20) If history is
any guide, creditors do not like to be lectured by their
debtors, and of course can use their economic muscle to im-
pose significant costs on debtors. (21) Some have even warned
that it is not wise to get into Beijing’s bad book. Rather, in
order to get Chinese cooperation on a host of pressing is-
sues, including Iran, North Korea, and trade and currency is-
sues, the Obama administration should refrain from engag-
ing in knee-jerk criticisms. (22) On the other hand, some ana-
lysts, most notably Drezner, remain more sceptical. They
claim that Chinese power and leverage has been greatly ex-
aggerated, and that Beijing’s ability to exert financial lever-
age and coerce the United States is greatly circumscribed. (23)
This paper straddles a broadly middle path between these
competing viewpoints. It argues that on the one hand,
China’s growing economic power provides Beijing with a un-
precedented policy autonomy – both the ability to resist
pressure from others as well as to apply leverage against
“wayward” sovereign debtors – very much like the un-
abashed powers the United States enjoyed in the early post-
war period. On the other hand, China’s deep and intimate
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15. Kathy Wang, “Protect China’s assets, US told,” The Standard: China’s Business
Newspaper, Friday, 5 December 2008, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news
_print.asp?art_id=75364&sid=21758213.
16. Niall Ferguson, “What ‘Chimerica’ Hath Wrought,” The American Interest Online,
January-February 2009, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=
533.
17. Paul Krugman, “Chinese New Year,” The New York Times, 1 January 2010; also see The
Economist, “America’s Fear of China,” 19 May 2007, and The Economist, “Mercantilism
with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Cheap Currency,” 12 August 2003. 
18. Paul Krugman, “Taking on China,” The New York Times, 15 March 2010.
19. Peter Morici, “Trade Deficit, China’s Currency Require U.S. Action Now,” 23 April 2010,
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/opinion/morici/2010/041310.aspx.
20. For a good account of how the United States became the world’s largest debtor, see
William Cline, The United States as a Debtor Nation, Washington, DC, Institute for
International Economics, 2005. 
21. Brad Setser, Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences of
American Indebtedness, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2008.
22. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “Courting China,” The National Interest, no. 106, March-April
2010, pp. 10-15.
23. Daniel Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power
Politics,” International Security, vol. 34, no. 2, Fall 2009, pp. 7-45.
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economic integration in the global economic system, in par-
ticular the ever-expanding economic interdependence and
convergence fostered via conspicuously wide-ranging trade,
investment, and commercial ties between China and the
United States, greatly constrains and circumscribes Beijing’s
ability to pressure, coerce, or punish the United States – de-
spite the irresistible temptation. The fact that the US is
China’s largest market, and paradoxically, that China holds
an estimated $2.3 trillion in US assets, means that Beijing’s
economic fate is inextricably linked to the economic fortunes
of its biggest debtor. This means that despite the frictions
(punctuated with periods of intense acrimony) in their rela-
tions, the reality is that neither side is quite prepared to push
the other beyond tacitly permissible limits, because for both
countries, the overall current economic gains are unlikely to
compensate for the enormous cost of conflict. Therefore, al-
though the discord in Sino-US economic relations will not
end anytime soon, it is important to put these recurrent wars-
of-words in perspective. Specifically, this paper suggests that
the current Sino-US economic disputes are really a form of
intense policy dispute characterised by hard bargaining, and
should not be exaggerated (as they usually are) with ominous
sounding rhetorical adjectives such as “confrontations” and
“geo-economic rivalry” with precipitous economic and secu-
rity implications. However, this does not mean that these cur-
rent and relatively benign relations should be taken for
granted. On the contrary, the subprime-induced financial cri-
sis has only exacerbated ongoing tensions in Sino-US eco-
nomic relations; interdependence also has limits, especially as
the global economy heads into a prolonged period of “hard
times.” The following sections will show that Beijing is con-
cerned and has been working diligently to reduce its systemic
dependence on its largest trading partner and debtor. The  issues  that  divide
Before the subprime crisis broke, China was the world’s
largest holder of foreign cash reserves of roughly US$2 tril-
lion (Chart 1). 
In fact, China had become the world’s leading creditor na-
tion (replacing Japan in 2003), while the United States is
the world’s largest debtor. (24) What explains how and why
the world’s once most prosperous and still the largest econ-
omy has become so structurally reliant on external financing
– or more bluntly, what explains the decline of the United
States to debtor status? In part, since the mid-1990s, the US
Treasury has met its borrowing needs by purchasing debt
from abroad. At the end of 1998, the foreign holdings of
Treasury securities totalled about $1.2 trillion (or roughly 37
percent of all debt held by the public); in 2008, the dollar
value of foreign-owned debt had jumped to just over to $2.9
trillion – or almost 50 percent of outstanding publicly held
debt. The largest foreign holders of US debt are countries
that run persistent trade surpluses with the United States.
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24. Nouriel Roubini, “The Almighty Renminbi,” The New York Times, 14 May 2009; Xin Wang,
“China as Net Creditor: An Indication of Strength or Weaknesses?”, China and World
Economy, vol. 15, no. 6, December 2007, pp. 22-36; and Brad Setser, “China: Creditor
to the Rich,” China Security, vol. 14, no. 4, Autumn 2008.
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Until September 2008, Japan was the largest holder of
Treasury debt, only to be replaced by the Chinese, whose
holdings of Treasury debt skyrocketed from about $46 bil-
lion in 1998 to $587 billion by 2008 (Table 1). (25) However,
China’s real holdings are estimated to be over $800 billion,
as China also purchases through third countries US debt
that is not recorded by the Treasury as being held by
China. (26) This means that Beijing is not only the largest for-
eign holder of US government debt (as it now owns $1 out
of every $10 in US public debt), but it is also in effect the
US government’s largest creditor. Indeed, Washington has
become increasingly dependent on Beijing to raise money to
cover its ever-growing list of expenditures, including paying
for the current stimulus and bailout programs. (27)
To many American policymakers this is an ominous sign, be-
cause America’s growing dependence and Beijing’s growing
financial leverage as a creditor grants it extraordinary influ-
ence over the US economy. If for economic or strategic rea-
sons Beijing decided to move out of US government bonds,
it would force other investors to do the same, and in the
process drive up the cost of US borrowing and undermine
Washington’s ability to manage the nation’s economy. Simi-
larly, if China stopped buying, or worse, began selling US
debt, it would sharply raise interest rates on a variety of loans
in the US. (28)
To the United States, the origins and persistence of its massive
trade deficit with China is due to Beijing’s mercantilist eco-
nomic policies (see Tables 2 and 3). The US contention re-
garding China’s mercantile behaviour is rather straightforward:
Beijing engages in gratuitously unfair trade practices via outright
protectionism, and most perniciously, by deliberately manipulat-
ing its currency. Specifically, in maintaining an undervalued ex-
change rate, Beijing has been able to dramatically increase its
export growth and pile up large current account surpluses – the
latter by aggressively intervening in foreign exchange markets to
keep its currency from appreciating. This in turn has resulted in
a massive build-up of foreign exchange reserves. (29) However, if
Beijing allowed market forces to determine the value of its cur-
rency, its current account surpluses would be much lower, and
American trade balances much healthier. (30)
Not surprisingly, American manufacturers, with the backing
of lawmakers in Congress, have long argued that the artifi-
cially low yuan has placed American companies at a huge
competitive disadvantage, inter alia contributing to the bank-
ruptcy of US companies and the loss of tens of thousands of
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25. Office of Management and Budget, Mid-Session Review, Budget of the US Government,
Fiscal Year 2009, July 2008, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ fy2009/pdf/09
msr.pdf. 
26. Brad Setser, “Impact of China Investment Corporation on the Management of China’s
Foreign Assets,” in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy (eds.), Debating China’s
Exchange Rate Policy, Washington, DC, The Peterson Institute, 2008, pp. 201-18. 
27. Also see Brad Setser and Arpana Pandey, “China’s $1.5 Trillion Bet: Understanding
China’s External Portfolio,” Working Paper, New York, Center for Geoeconomic Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009. 
28. Brad Setser, Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences of
American Indebtedness, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2008; also see
Matthew Burrows and Jennifer Harris, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the
Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 2, April 2009, pp. 27-38.
29. Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, “China’s Role in the Revived Bretton Woods
System: A Case of Mistaken Identity,” Working Paper 05-2, Washington, DC, Peterson
Institute for International Economics, 2005.
30. Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, China’s Currency: A Summary of the Economic
Issues, Congressional Research Service, 13 April 2009, no. RS21625, Washington, DC.
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As of September 2008 $ Billions Percent of Debt Held by the Public
China 587.0 10.1
Japan 573.2 9.8
United Kingdom 338.3 5.8
Caribbean Banking Centres [1] 185.3 3.2
Oil Exporters [2] 182.1 3.1
Brazil 141.9 2.4
All Other 852.9 14.6
Total 2,860.7 49.0
Table 1. Major Foreign Holders of US Treasury Securities
Notes: 1. Caribbean banking centres include Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Panama and British Virgin Islands. 
2. Oil exporters include Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, 
2. Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.
Source: US Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, 2009, Table OFS-1.
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American jobs. (32) The contention is that the yuan is so un-
dervalued (by some accounts as much as 40 percent) that it
amounts to an unfair trade subsidy. This unfair advantage
permits a flood of cheap Chinese-made goods into the
United States, but makes American products expensive in
China. (33) Thus it is claimed that if the yuan were traded at
its true market worth the bilateral imbalance between the
two countries would be substantially reduced, if not alto-
gether eliminated. This is because China’s exports to the
United States would become more expensive in dollars and
would therefore decrease, while China’s imports from the
US would become less expensive in yuan and therefore in-
crease. To make matters worse, China’s unwillingness to
allow the yuan to appreciate has, in turn, made other Asian
Pacific Rim countries reluctant to allow their currencies to
appreciate because of their fear of losing further export sales
to China. (34) As the US trade deficit with China soared to
record levels in first-quarter 2005, the Bush administration
came under intense pressure to take unilateral action to ad-
dress the problems associated with the artificial undervalua-
tion of the yuan. US Treasury Secretary John Snow called
for an immediate Chinese exchange rate adjustment, but
many other lawmakers called for punitive tariffs on cheaply
priced Chinese imports unless China sharply revalued its
currency.
In May 2005, the US Senate by a margin of 67 to 33 voted
to consider a proposal to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on all
imports from China unless Beijing stopped inflating its cur-
rency. In May 2005, the US decided to re-impose quotas on
seven categories of clothing imports from China, limiting
their growth to no more than 7.5 percent over a 12-month
period. On 23 June 2005, the Bush administration, which
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31. Full source: Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report for Congress: China-U.S. Trade Issues,
Order Code 33536, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, 7 March 2008.
32. From its peak in early 1998, the United States has lost over 3.3 million manufacturing
jobs. While not all of the job loss can be attributed to China, the US manufacturing sec-
tor, despite significant productivity growth, could not overcome the huge trade advan-
tage China gained by having an undervalued currency. The decline in manufacturing
employment has led both Democratic and Republican senators to threaten the Chinese
with substantial tariffs on Chinese imports to offset the Chinese currency advantage. For
details, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Yee Wong, “China Bashing,” International
Economics Policy Briefs, no. PB04-5, Washington, DC, Institute for International
Economics, 2004.
33. Some economists claim the yuan is anywhere from 15 percent to 40 percent underval-
ued against the dollar, making Chinese exports to the United States cheaper and con-
tributing to China’s trade surplus with the United States. Of course, no one really knows
the true extent of the undervaluation. This is because not letting the market decide a
currency’s value means the nominal exchange rate – literally the number of units of one
currency you can get for one unit of another – is essentially made up. It is whatever the
government chooses it to be, so long as the regime can be feasibly maintained. For a
good overview, see Nicholas Lardy, “China: The Great New Economic Challenge,” in C.
Fred Bergsten (ed.), The United States and the World Economy: Foreign Economic Policy
for the Next Decade, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 2005; Arvind
Subramanian, “New PPP-Based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy
Implications,” Policy Brief, no. PB10-8, April 2010, Washington, DC, Peterson Institute for
International Economics; and Anthony J. Makin, “Does China’s Huge External Surplus
Imply an Undervalued Renminbi,” China and the World Economy, vol. 15, no. 3, 2007,
pp. 89-102. 
34. Indeed, following the Chinese revaluation, Malaysia responded by shifting its own cur-
rency regime from a dollar peg to a basket peg. However, given the very small initial
change in the yuan’s value, most countries in the region seems to be waiting for a more
substantial yuan revaluation before taking action.
Year US Exports US Imports US Trade Balance
1980 3.8 1.1 2.7
1985 3.9 3.9 0
1990 4.8 15.2 -10.4
1995 11.7 45.6 -33.8
2000 16.3 100.1 -83.8
2001 19.2 102.3 -83.1
2002 22.1 125.2 -103.1
2003 28.4 152.4 -124.0
2004 34.7 196.7 -162.0
2005 41.8 243.5 -201.6
2006 55.2 287.8 -232.5
2007 65.2 321.5 -256.3
Table 2. US Merchandise Trade with China: 1980-2007 ($ in billions)
Source: US Congressional Research Service (2008, p.2) (31)
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
China as the World’s Creditor and the United States as the World’s Debtor
until then had insisted that diplomacy was working in getting
China to allow the yuan’s value to be set by currency mar-
kets rather than be controlled by the government, finally
warned China that it could be cited as a “currency manipu-
lator” and face economic sanctions unless it switched to a
flexible exchange system. Labelling China’s currency poli-
cies “highly distortionary,” the Bush administration warned
that it was going to closely monitor China’s progress towards
adopting a flexible exchange system.
It seems that the pressure worked. On 21 July 2005, Beijing
made its biggest monetary shift in more than a decade by
revaluing the yuan and dropping the currency’s peg to the
US dollar by announcing that the yuan’s exchange rate
would become “adjustable, based on market supply and de-
mand with reference to exchange rate movements of curren-
cies in a basket” composed of the dollar, the yen, and the
euro, along with a few other key currencies. (35) This was an
important, albeit modest shift. From 1994 to July 2005, the
value of the yuan was pegged to the US dollar at a rate de-
termined by the People’s Bank of China. The yuan traded
within the range of 8.27 to 8.28 to the dollar because the
People’s Bank maintained this peg by buying dollar-denom-
inated assets in exchange for the yuan in order to reduce ex-
cess demand for the yuan. As a result, the exchange rate be-
tween the yuan and the dollar remained largely the same –
despite changing market conditions. When Beijing aban-
doned the peg by moving to a system that now linked the
yuan to a basket of currencies, it effectively raised the yuan’s
value by 2.1 percent. (36) This meant that prior to the revalu-
ation, US$1 bought 8.28 yuan, and following revaluation
US$1 would buy roughly 8.11 yuan. Beijing made it clear
that it had set tight parameters on how much the yuan could
rise. Clearly, the aim was to make sure that the yuan did not
float by a big margin, but appreciated (37) by a modest 2 per-
cent by moving within a tight range of a 0.3 percent band
against a group of foreign currencies that make up China’s
top trading partners. (38) Thus, unlike a true floating exchange
rate, the yuan was allowed to fluctuate by only 0.3 percent
on a daily basis against the basket. However, this modest
and gradual appreciation (called “managed float”) allowed
China to continue to accumulate foreign reserves – implying
that if the yuan was allowed to free float, it would appreci-
ate much more rapidly. The fact that from July 2005 to May
2008 the yuan appreciated by 14.4 percent in terms of the
US dollar – but much less in real effective terms (since most
other major currencies have appreciated against the dollar)
– despite China’s large and growing trade surpluses, barely
managed to placate critics. However, as noted earlier, when
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35. Revaluation is the resetting of the fixed value of a currency at a higher level.
36. Both flexible and floating exchange rates have distinct advantages – albeit, no single
exchange rate regime is appropriate for all countries in all circumstances. A fixed
exchange rate that pegs the value of a currency to a stronger foreign currency like the
US dollar or the euro has advantages for developing countries seeking to build confi-
dence in their economic policies. On the other hand, countries with fixed exchange rates
are seemingly more vulnerable to currency crises. As economies mature and become
more closely aligned with the international financial markets, exchange rate flexibility
seems more advantageous. 
37. When a currency increases in value, it experiences appreciation. When it falls in value
and is worth fewer US dollars, it undergoes depreciation. Thus, when a country’s cur-
rency appreciates (rises in value relative to other currencies), the country’s goods
abroad become more expensive, and foreign goods in that country become cheaper.
Conversely, when a country’s currency depreciates, its goods abroad become cheaper,
and foreign goods in that country become more expensive.
38. Both the Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan and Premier Wen Jiabao noted that the
revaluation should be viewed as the first in what is expected to be a series of steps over
years to shift the yuan toward even greater flexibility as China increases its participa-
tion in the world trading system. See People’s Bank of China, “Public Announcement of
the People’s Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Exchange Rate Regime,” 21 July
2005, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=82.
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Country / Trading Group US Trade Balance
World -791.0
China -256.3
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) -127.4
European Union (EU27) -107.4
Japan -82.8
Mexico -74.3
Canada -64.7
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -50.6
Table 3. US Merchandise Trade Balances with Major Trading Partners: 2007 ($ in billions)
Source: US Congressional Research Service (2008, p.2) (31)
107
Ar t i c l es
Beijing in 2008 resumed its earlier practice of pegging the
renminbi to revive its faltering export-dependent economy
(chart 2), the gloves came-off.The  t ies  that  b ind
Although few will dispute that the dramatic expansion of
Beijing’s economic influence over the American economy is
not healthy, what is not always appreciated is that economic
interdependence also generates countervailing forces that
tend to push towards a more balanced equilibrium. For ex-
ample, on the one hand, China purchases US bonds (which
are denominated in dollars) to make the dollar stronger
against the yuan as an artificially weak yuan helps to boost
Chinese exports, in addition to making Chinese exports
cheaper relative to US exports. (40) On the other, growing
Chinese investment in the United States has helped bring
down interest rates, as well as assisting in the financing of
the $1 trillion annual US deficit – and the US government’s
current massive bailout of its financial system. Also, as Krug-
man and others are fond of repeating, China needs the
United States more than the United States needs China, be-
cause when the debts become too massive, there are always
more risks for the creditor. In other words, underscoring the
old adage that “If you owe the bank a thousand dollars you
worry, but if you owe the bank a million dollars, the bank
worries,” China’s growing financial clout is also profoundly
limited by its major debtor – the United States. Beijing not
only depends on a strong dollar to keep its export engines
humming, it has also put itself in the unenviable position
where it has to literally defend the dollar value. 
In fact, reminiscent of Japan, which also had the bulk of its
foreign assets denominated in US dollars rather than yen,
and them saw the value of those assets drop when the US
dollar depreciated sharply following the Plaza Accords in
1985, China today faces the same risks – and more. China
is often referred to as an “immature creditor” because it does
not lend in its own currency, but in the currency issued by
borrower (the loans China makes are denominated in US
dollars); it is therefore exposed to exchange rate risks as the
value of the debt fluctuates with the dollar’s rise and fall.
Since an unprecedented 80 percent of China’s reserves are
estimated to be in dollars, even a modest depreciation of the
dollar will translate into significant losses for Beijing. Martin
Feldstein captures this irony lucidly when he notes, “Con-
sider what a decline of the dollar relative to the yuan would
mean for the Chinese. If the Chinese now hold $1 trillion
in their official portfolios, a 10 percent rise in the yuan-dol-
lar exchange rate would lower the yuan value of those hold-
ings by 10 percent.” (41) As a result, China has great incen-
tive to defend the US dollar – and the fastest and easiest
way to do this is to buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed,
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39. Chart 2 downloaded from Owen F. Humpage and Caroline Herrell, “Renminbi-Dollar Peg
Once Again,” Economic Trends, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 25 November 2009. 
40. Geoff Dyer, “China’s Dollar Dilemma,” Financial Times, 22 February, 2009; Paul
Krugman, “China’s Dollar Trap,” The New York Times, 3 April 2009; David Leonhardt,
“The China Puzzle,” The New York Times Magazine, 17 May 2009. 
41. Martin Feldstein, “How Safe Are Your Dollars?”, Project Syndicate, 25 February 2010,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/feldstein20/English.
Chart 2. Renminbi-Dollar Exchange Rate (Renminbi per U.S. dollar) (39)
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
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China as the World’s Creditor and the United States as the World’s Debtor
a few years ago, Ronald McKinnon boldly predicted that
Beijing would maintain its informal dollar peg and continue
to accumulate dollar reserves as long as the dollar remains a
useful monetary anchor – which he claims is indefinitely. (42)
This also means that the argument that Beijing can punish
the United States by dumping its holdings of Treasury debt
(the resulting market disruption would lead to higher US in-
terest rates and a collapse of the dollar on foreign exchange
markets) is not compelling. The Congressional Research
Service has persuasively argued that such a sudden and
highly disruptive strategy is not in the cards because it is un-
likely to be effective. (43) This is because even the largest for-
eign holdings of US government debt are smaller than the
daily volume of trade in Treasury securities. If the Chinese
did employ such a strategy, the resulting decline in the value
of US Treasury securities would generate substantial losses
to all debt holders, including those attempting to use their
debt holdings as leverage. Similarly, Beijing’s repeated call
(if not subtle “threat”) for the creation of a new international
reserve currency, the use of IMF’s SDR, and to make the
renminbi an international alternative to the US dollar, is not
credible. Indeed, there is little danger that the dollar will be
replaced as the world’s dominant foreign exchange reserve
anytime soon. For starters, before the yuan can be brought
into competition with the dollar as a medium of international
trade, it must be first made into a convertible currency
whose value is determined by the market. Beijing simply can-
not allow this, as it would not only mean loss of control by
the Party-state, but also that China would have to lower or
remove all manner of financial and trade barriers – which it
is not prepared to do. Regarding SDRs: although a country
can convert its reserves into SDRs, this does not mean that
the SDRs can automatically function as an international cur-
rency. Specifically, until the private sector adopts SDRs,
countries that adopt the SDRs will still need to acquire dol-
lars or euros or some other national currency to spend their
reserves. Suffice it to note that the private sector will only
adopt the SDR if it provides tangible benefits – something
it does not do at the moment. 
Despite its bold claims, Beijing also realises this. The reality
is that even while the dollar’s weakness undermines the
value of China’s existing reserves, Beijing really has no inter-
est in exacerbating or precipitating a crisis by moving out of
dollar assets. In other words, although there is nothing to
prevent China from diversifying its reserves away from the
dollar, such an action is not without risk. Given the fact that
China now owns so many dollars, any massive sell-off will
also push the dollar down with huge losses on China’s dol-
lar-denominated assets. Not surprisingly, as if to calm the
nervous currency markets, Central Bank Governor Zhou
had to quickly reverse his statement by announcing that
China would continue to buy Treasuries. In fact, the day
after Zhou called for the new reserve currency, China’s in-
fluential State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a
statement that it supported the dollar and would continue to
buy US Treasuries. 
Moreover, the sheer size of the US share of the world econ-
omy (27.5 percent in 2006), and the world’s seemingly insa-
tiable appetite for dollar-denominated assets means that the
economic law of gravity does not necessarily apply to the
US. After all, the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency.
A large portion of international payments are made in dol-
lars, and a substantial portion of international trade (even
trade not directly involving the United States) is denomi-
nated in US dollars. In addition, globally traded commodi-
ties (such as oil and food grains) are priced in dollars. Thus,
foreign banks hold portfolios of dollar assets and liabilities.
Overall, some two-thirds of the world’s official foreign ex-
change reserves of $6.7 trillion are held in dollars. This
means that central banks around the world not only hold
more US dollars and dollar securities than they do assets de-
nominated in any other foreign currency, they also know that
these dollar reserves are essential to stabilising the value of
their own national currencies. Indeed, the prevailing assump-
tion that if the American economy went into a sharp down-
turn, foreign central banks would be reluctant to invest their
national savings into the dollar has so far proven to be incor-
rect. Rather, the dollar has once again been affirmed as the
global reserve currency. The massive “flight to safety” into
US Treasury by panicked investors following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers only underscores that the US government
is still the safest investment in the world, and that for all their
flaws, the US dollar and dollar-denominated assets are today
akin to what gold was during the Bretton Woods era.
The oft-mentioned phrase that China is the “world’s fac-
tory” is both a blessing and a curse. China is not only the
world’s largest exporter of manufactured products, but also a
major exporter of agricultural commodities and other raw
materials. This means that the Chinese economy is struc-
turally dependent on exports. China’s share of merchandise
exports increased from about $10 billion in the late 1970s to
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42. Ronald McKinnon, Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard: Living with
Conflicted Virtue, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2005. 
43. Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, “China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications
for the U.S. Economy,” Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL34314, 19 May
2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf.
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$326 billion in 2002. More precisely, China’s total share in
world trade expanded from 1 percent in 1980 to about 6 per-
cent in 2004. (44) In 2004, China’s merchandise trade with
the world totalled around $1.3 trillion – the result of annual
growth rates above 30 percent in some years. By the end of
2004, China had become the third-largest trading nation in
dollar terms, behind the United States and Germany and
just ahead of Japan. (45) By 2008, net exports (or the trade-
balance surplus) were about 12 percent of GDP (up from 2
percent earlier in the decade), and exports represented
about 40 percent of China’s GDP. Overall, with the sum of
exports and investment representing about 80 percent of
GDP, China’s aggregate demand depends on its ability to
sustain export-based economic growth. Thus, Beijing has an
enormous stake in the smooth expansion of global commerce
and in upholding the global economic order.
Finally, China’s policy-makers are a pragmatic lot and are
hardly interested in precipitating a potentially ugly and pro-
tracted trade war with its major trading partner. They are
cognizant of the fact that their country’s rapid rise as a global
creditor at such an early stage of economic development also
reflects an inherent weakness in the Chinese economy.
There are two core aspects to this. First is the constant need
by China to expand its current account surplus. That is, al-
though Japan became a major creditor following the sharp
appreciation of the yen and accompanying monetary easing
following the Plaza Accord of 1985 (giving rise to excess liq-
uidity), Japan (unlike China) is also a major industrial
power with relatively strong economic fundamentals. On the
other hand, China’s net foreign asset (NFA) position (or the
difference between external assets and liabilities) has only
swung from net debtor status to net creditor status over the
past decade. Although China’s NFA position exceeded 30
percent of GDP by 2007, its per capita GDP was still only
$2,500 – or less than one tenth of the OECD average. This
means that China’s rapidly growing NFA position since the
beginning of 2000 is mainly the result of its burgeoning cur-
rent account surplus, complemented by the high domestic
savings rate relative to its high domestic investment rate.
This savings-investment gap could pose a serious problem if
the current account continues to weaken.
Second, the paradox: What explains why China, still a very
poor country in terms of GDP per capita (China’s GDP per
capita ranks around 100th in the world) and relative scarcity
of capital, is now a global creditor and exporter of capital to
the world’s richest nation? In other words, why is China sub-
sidising the world’s richest country? Beijing understands that
the problem, in part, is reflective of China’s deeply-rooted
institutional and structural weaknesses. China’s woefully un-
derdeveloped capital markets, a weak (and fragile) banking
sector, two highly speculative stock markets, a rudimentary
government bond market, poor resource allocation, and a
non-existent social security system prevent effective utilisa-
tion and investment of the country’s national savings. China
must effectively address its many domestic economic prob-
lems, including restructuring bank balance sheets, strength-
ening domestic capital markets, creating foreign-exchange
hedging instruments, and improving corporate governance,
among other things, to overcome the domestic constraints to
prudent investments. While these processes have begun in
some sectors, it will take time. Beijing is well aware that at
present there are few viable alternatives to US dollar hold-
ings. Yet, they also know that China must fundamentally
deepen economic reforms and allow market forces to play a
decisive role in resource allocation, including modernising
and opening the domestic financial markets to better medi-
ate the nation’s wealth. (46) In the meantime, Beijing must
heed Deng Xiaoping’s sage admonition and “bide its time”
to facilitate its “peaceful rise.”Loosening the  t ies  o f  interdependence
Of course, economic interdependence and convergence
does not necessarily mean absence of conflict. After all, the
gains of interdependence are not always aligned in a perfect
equilibrium. As Sino-US economic relations have become
disproportionately one-sided (at least in terms of trade and
surplus), acrimony and discord have intensified. Apparently,
anticipating a more adversarial or “hardball” US position,
Beijing is reassessing its economic relations with the United
States – with an eye on reducing its dependence. There are
a number of possible scenarios. At the extreme, intense
pressure by the United States could force a beleaguered Bei-
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jing to retaliate. For example, declaring China a “currency
manipulator” and imposing punitive measures could push
Beijing to liquidate some of its US Treasury bonds. Con-
trary to conventional belief, this would not be as difficult as
one thinks. After all, not only are China’s foreign assets held
as “official” foreign exchange reserves, but the Chinese
party-state has a pervasive command over the economy via
its control of the banking sector. It can act quickly and deci-
sively. Moreover, in contrast to Japan, China does not have
to be deferential (or more aptly kowtow) to the United
States. Despite being a creditor, Japan, a member of the
western alliance and beneficiary of the American security
umbrella, was under American tutelage and “indebted” to its
major debtor. However, China, a competitor to American
power and influence, and whose relations with its major
debtor can best be described as a “marriage of conven-
ience,” has a freer hand to utilise its economic leverage as a
tool of foreign policy. Beijing’s actions would no doubt inflict
much pain on investors in US Treasury debt – both foreign
and domestic. China will be a big loser (a case of cutting its
nose to spite its face), but investors would also lose faith in
the ability of the US government to meet its obligations in
the face of unsustainable, long-term structural deficits. To re-
iterate, since the lion’s share of China’s foreign exchange re-
serves are invested in US Treasury securities (this has
helped keep down interest rates in the United States despite
chronic budget deficits and weak domestic savings), any sig-
nificant changes in China’s management of its foreign ex-
change could have a profoundly negative impact in the
American securities markets.
Of course, Beijing would prefer to reduce its dependence in
a more measured and gradual manner. In fact, Beijing has
been seriously examining its options regarding the cost of
maintaining the dollar-based system. It is rightfully con-
cerned that the exploding US government deficit has a real
potential to lead to inflation and sharply reduce the purchas-
ing power of its dollar-denominated financial assets. As a
hedge against this, Beijing has been contemplating and ex-
perimenting with a number of strategies, including short-
term arrangements to diversify its investment portfolios away
from US dollars. On this issue, China is hardly alone. Both
Russia and India have also called for an end to the dollar’s
dominance in the international monetary system. Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev on several occasions has noted
that the dollar system is “flawed” and that a new suprana-
tional currency should be created. Similarly, a senior eco-
nomic adviser to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
has urged the government to diversify its $264.6 billion for-
eign-exchange reserves (2008 figures) and hold fewer dol-
lars. Like China, both have claimed that world currencies
need to adjust to help unwind trade imbalances that con-
tributed to the global financial crisis.
However, unlike Russia and India, China is not waiting. In
2009, Beijing signed currency swap agreements totalling
about 650 billion yuan (or about US$95 billion) with Hong
Kong, Argentina, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and
Belarus. This will now allow these countries to settle ac-
counts with China using the yuan rather than the dollar. In
July 2009, the People’s Bank took another step towards in-
ternationalising its currency and reducing reliance on the US
dollar with the announcement of new rules to allow select
companies to invoice and settle trade transactions in ren-
minbi through financial institutions in Shanghai, Hong
Kong, and Macao. This means that importers and exporters
will now be able to place their orders with approved Chinese
companies and settle payment in renminbi. In addition,
Hong Kong banks will now be allowed to issue yuan-denom-
inated bonds – a step towards building an offshore yuan mar-
ket, while foreign banks will be allowed to buy or borrow
yuan from mainland lenders to finance such trade. While the
central bank has averred that this does not mean full convert-
ibility of the renminbi, but is only meant to provide stability
for local exporters hard hit by the dollar’s widely fluctuating
value, it does underscore Beijing’s growing concern about
the future of the green-back and is in line with its ambition
to make the yuan an internationally traded currency. In the
meantime, China continues to be a significant net buyer of
US bonds, mainly Treasuries.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, bitter historical legacies
are not necessarily a barrier to deep economic cooperation.
Despite their painful recent past, China, Japan, and South
Korea (the region’s three biggest economies) have formed
an ambitious “united front” to counter the adverse effects of
global financial turmoil. On 13 December 2008, the leaders
of the three nations held their first-ever summit in Japan.
The summit signalled an unprecedented phase of coopera-
tion between the three nations, with Japan and China ex-
panding credit lines for currency agreements with South
Korea to strengthen the won. Again, on 23 February 2009,
against the backdrop of the deepening financial crisis, the
Finance Ministers from China, Japan, South Korea, and ten
Southeast Asian nations agreed to create a US$120 billion
pool of foreign-exchange reserves to be used by countries to
defend their currencies from speculative attacks. The agree-
ment significantly broadens the earlier arrangement called
the “Chiang Mai Initiative” (which only allows bilateral cur-
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rency swaps) (47) by functioning as a de facto system of re-
gional macroeconomic monitoring and cooperation. (48) In a
joint statement, Chinese Premier Wen, Japanese Prime
Minister Taro Aso, and South Korean President Lee
Myung-Bak also vowed to boost regional trade and invest-
ment. Their communiqué reaffirmed the importance of close
regional cooperation to counter the financial crisis. On 24
March 2010, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
(CMIM) formally came into effect. The body’s responsibil-
ities include monitoring the economic and financial status of
ASEAN+3 countries (Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, plus China, Japan, and South Korea) and providing
guidelines regarding the use of the foreign currency reserve
pool. In addition, the ASEAN+3 countries also agreed to
create a regional credit guarantee and investment fund with
an initial grant of $700 million to promote the issuance of
bonds in domestic currencies within the region. Clearly,
China is increasingly looking beyond the United States. 
China has also been actively engaged in “strategic economic
expansion.” (49) Specifically, Beijing has become an active
participant in the international markets for mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&A). Its gross foreign holdings acquired
through M&As, “basically nonexistent 20 years ago,
reached over $87 billion by the end of 2008… two main
types of foreign direct investment are ‘greenfield,’ in which
a company builds a plant in a target country, and direct in-
vestment through mergers and acquisitions, in which a com-
pany purchases a large stake in an existing foreign firm.” (50)
More significantly, Beijing has been transferring part of the
nation’s wealth into “sovereign wealth funds.” Since 2007,
Beijing has allocated some $200 billion into a sovereign
wealth fund under the management of the government-spon-
sored China Investment Corporation (CIC) to be used for
investment abroad. It is the largest state-owned fund in the
world. This financial power provides Beijing with a unique
opportunity to extend its global reach by enhancing its abil-
ity to purchase or gain major ownership stakes in businesses,
financial institutions, resources, and technology. One of the
first announced investments of CIC was a 10 percent stake
in the US-based private equity firm Blackstone Group. Al-
though this raised concern on Wall Street at the prospect of
“growing Chinese influence”  on US corporate
operations  through the stock market, Washington could do
little to stop it. As a large investor in US Treasuries, China
claimed that it was simply trying to earn a higher return on
its foreign investments by dividing its assets into stocks,
bonds, and commodities such as oil and gold. This trend will
continue. Chinese financial institutions have come under in-
tense criticism at home for bad investments in the United
States, including the $5.6 billion share in Morgan Stanley
purchased by the China Investment Corporation and the
large paper losses on the $3 billion CIC invested in Black-
stone Group in June 2007. As a result, Beijing’s top priority
is to broaden investments and reduce risk – which at its
heart is a reduction in the purchase of US Treasuries. Not
surprisingly, China, a large foreign investor in bonds from
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has been sharply reducing its
holdings of that debt. After making direct net purchases of
$46 billion in the first half of 2008, Beijing was a net seller
of $26.1 billion in the second half of 2008. In fact, it was
weak demand from China and other foreign investors that
led the US Federal Reserve to announce in November 2008
that it would buy up to $600 billion in debt from Fannie,
Freddie, and other US government-related mortgage compa-
nies. 
Beijing also realises that its attempt to paint itself as a help-
less victim of the US dollar is losing traction and sounds in-
creasingly disingenuous. The charge by Krugman and others
that China’s problems are fundamentally rooted in its delib-
erate strategy of “mercantilism” has now stuck. Arguably
more importantly, the subprime crisis has finally forced Bei-
jing to rethink its currency’s close links to the US dollar. Al-
though the exponential growth of China’s massive foreign-
exchange reserves has been the result of trying to sustain a
stable exchange rate between the yuan and the dollar – even
in the face of strong economic pressures for appreciation
(given China’s strong productivity growth, it is natural for the
yuan to appreciate), this linkage is becoming increasingly
burdensome. To prevent appreciation and avoid loss of ex-
port competitiveness, the People’s Bank has been forced to
aggressively buy dollars and sell renminbi. However, this
strategy has not been without pain. Besides making domes-
tic macroeconomic management difficult (China’s controls
on private exchanges of renminbi for other currencies are not
always effective), concentration on exchange-rate stabilisa-
tion has meant that Beijing has largely ceded the ability to
use monetary policy to target domestic objectives such as
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controlling inflation. Consequently, the continuous deprecia-
tion of the US dollar has not only increased uncertainties as-
sociated with capital movement, but also exerts the pressure
of imported inflation on China by driving up commodities
prices in dollar terms. The sharp hike in food prices in re-
cent years has already eroded the gains made in economic
development, especially poverty reduction. Moreover, the
subprime-induced general tightening of the global credit mar-
kets and the resultant “credit crunch” has reduced capital
flows into China. Over the short term this may not be a se-
rious problem, as China has a fair amount of liquidity in the
domestic economy.  However, if the problem persists over
time, the credit crunch could have a negative impact. For ex-
ample, an impact on the business sector’s ability to raise
funds from international sources can impede investment
growth, as these businesses would have to rely more on cost-
lier domestic sources of financing, including bank credit.
This could in turn put further upward pressure on domestic
interest rates. 
Beijing is aware that it would be more prudent to adopt a
more flexible exchange rate. After all, China’s emphasis on
exchange rate stability in the face of rising current account
surpluses has not only generated intense protectionist pres-
sures in the United States and elsewhere, but has also forced
the central bank to accumulate massive foreign exchange re-
serves with negative domestic consequences. Keeping the
yuan from rising against the dollar not only means that
China’s central bank has to print more money to keep inter-
est rates low, as noted, but could also exacerbate the prob-
lem of inflation if more money ends up chasing too few
goods. It also means that China is exposed to large capital
losses on its foreign reserve holdings (which, again as noted,
are largely held in US dollars) as the renminbi appreciates.
Moreover, an appreciation of the exchange rate would also
boost domestic consumption – something China needs. The
adoption of a flexible exchange rate would give China
greater leverage to limit deviations of inflation and growth
from chosen targets by means of a monetary policy focused
on domestic objectives. Of course, such a policy does not
imply totally ignoring the exchange rate, as it may require
the authorities to intervene in the exchange market to limit
short-run currency fluctuations. Nor does it mean that a
move towards a more flexible rate is an argument for capital
account liberalisation. Suffice it to say there are numerous
cases of countries operating managed floats while maintain-
ing capital controls. Rather, the adoption of a monetary pol-
icy aimed at domestic objectives would help China develop
a more balanced and resilient financial system.   
Finally, facing growing protectionist pressures from the US
and elsewhere, China now appreciates more the upside of
reducing its reliance on exports as a main growth engine by
strengthening domestic demand. On 11 November 2008,
Beijing approved a massive 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion)
stimulus package over two years. Totalling some 14 percent
of annual GDP, it is arguably the biggest peacetime stimu-
lus ever. (51) The package has ten targeted spending items, in-
cluding construction and rural infrastructure, as well as more
“harmonious growth” via increased investment in the public
health care system, education, subsidised housing, and in-
creases in unemployment and other welfare benefits. Since
the political legitimacy of the Communist Party rests on con-
tinuing to deliver high economic growth, the subprime crisis,
especially Beijing’s decision to put so much of the nation’s
hard-earned savings in low-yield dollar-denominated bonds
(despite the growing needs at home) has generated wide-
spread public anger. According to Martin Feldstein, “The
value of the dollar portfolio is equal to about $1,000 per per-
son in China, about the level of the total per capita income
in China at the official exchange rate.” (52) Arguably, popular
resentment against the Party-elite, official corruption, and
growing economic inequalities partly explain why one of the
best-selling books in the People’s Republic is Song Hong-
bing’s Currency Wars – an angry, half-baked account that
blames financial crises on “conspiracies by the rich national
elites and the Jews seeking world domination,” and says that
China should be prepared to fight “bloodless wars” waged
by evil forces like the US Federal Reserve aimed at destroy-
ing China’s economy. Even if Beijing dismisses the ranting
of a crack-pot, it realises that the fruits of economic develop-
ment need to be more widely shared – and the best way is
to foster domestic demand. Conclus ion
Beijing is no doubt deeply concerned about the trajectory of
the American economy. They have every reason to be wor-
ried. If current trends continue, China’s huge dollar-denom-
inated foreign reserves could lose significant value in coming
years. The literally unrestrained printing of money by the
United States has the real potential for generating run-away
inflation – which in turn will decimate the underlying value
of China’s hard-earned dollar holdings. Compounding this is
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the genuine fear of the United States imposing ever more
onerous conditions. Not surprisingly, these gnawing con-
cerns have made Beijing increasingly irritated by the “self-
serving” statements coming from Washington. This very
much explains the growing assertiveness on the part of
China, especially its willingness to roundly criticise US eco-
nomic policies – especially those pertaining to China. In a
sense, the tables are now turned. For years, Washington has
pushed China (and other emerging economies) to emulate
US-style free-market capitalism. Among other things, this
has meant that China should liberalise capital flows and let
its currency appreciate in line with market forces. Not long
ago such American “advice” had the sympathetic ears of re-
formers in Beijing. As the so-called “Anglo-American
model” of capitalism has fallen increasingly out of favour,
critics have become increasingly emboldened. (53) China will
not be alone in criticising – sometimes sharply – its erstwhile
debtor. Postsc ript
The crisis in the euro-zone is particularly bad news for
China. The euro has plummeted against the renminbi
(whose value is pegged to that of the dollar) making Chi-
nese exports to Europe less competitive, while giving
euro-zone companies an advantage in the Chinese mar-
ket. The euro’s fall makes it less likely that Beijing will
break the renminbi’s peg to the dollar (to appease Wash-
ington, Chinese policy makers had earlier alluded to the
possibility of breaking the dollar peg and letting the ren-
minbi modestly rise in value). Now, the renminbi’s rise
against the dollar would also mean a further increase in
its value against the euro, thereby making Chinese ex-
ports to Europe much less competitive. Not surprisingly,
on 24 May 2010, during the start of the second round of
the “US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” Bei-
jing once again repeated its commitment to reform its cur-
rency – but based on “independent decision-making” and
at its own pace, meaning Beijing will not let the renminbi
rise. This problem will be further exacerbated if there is
tighter access to trade finance from Chinese and foreign
banks. Chinese exporters rely very heavily on bank letters
of credit to finance their shipments – and a sovereign
debt crisis usually leads to a cut in the issuance of letters
of credit for trade finance. (54)
On 10 June 2010, during a heated Senate Finance panel
hearing on US-China trade relations, both Democratic and
Republican lawmakers heaped criticism on Geithner and
the Obama administration for their lack of progress in deal-
ing with Beijing’s mercantilist economic and currency poli-
cies. Senator Schumer angrily noted, “Billions and billions
of dollars, millions and millions of jobs flow to China simply
because their currency is manipulated.” He warned that
Congress is now working on legislation that would impose
tough trade sanctions on China. Schumer noted: “China’s
mercantilist policies continue to undermine the health of
U.S. industries, so this is fair warning... despite the admin-
istration asking us not to do it, we are going to move forward
with our bipartisan legislation…. I am confident that this bill
will pass the Senate with overwhelming support. The issue
here is not U.S. protectionism but China’s flouting of the
rules of free trade.” It remains to be seen how long the ad-
ministration can resist the growing congressional pressure. (55)
On 19 June 2010 (a week before the Group of 20 summit),
China’s central bank released a statement signalling the pos-
sible end to the yuan’s 23-month-old dollar peg. (56) Beijing
made clear that domestic economic conditions were behind
the shift, stating that “the recovery and upturn of the Chi-
nese economy has become more solid with the enhanced
economic stability… It is desirable to proceed further with
reform of the renminbi exchange-rate regime and increase
the renminbi exchange-rate flexibility.” (57) However, the
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statement remained vague regarding when the central bank
would implement the change. Beijing clearly ruled out a
one-time revaluation by noting that there is no basis for
“large-scale appreciation.” Beijing’s move will no doubt
help deflect criticism from the Obama administration and
other G-20 nations at the G-20 meeting in Toronto on June
26-27. Of course, what Geithner has called “vigorous im-
plementation” will silence the critics. While Geithner
called the move an “important step,” he also added, “The
test will be how far and how fast they let the currency ap-
preciate.” (58) However, Senator Schumer cynically noted,
“This vague and limited statement of intentions is China’s
typical response to pressure… Until there is more specific
information about how quickly it will let its currency appre-
ciate and by how much, we can have no good feeling that
the Chinese will start playing by the rules.” (59) Schumer
warned, “We hope the Chinese will get more specific in the
next few days. If not, then for the sake of American jobs
and wealth, which are hurt every day by China’s practices,
we will have no choice but to move forward with our legis-
lation.” (60) •
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